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Hooks and Robinson argue that moral hazard induced by deposit insurance induced banks to invest
in riskier assets in Texas during the 1920s. Their regressions suggest this manifestation of moral hazard
may explain a portion of the events that occurred during the 1920s, but some other phenomena, hitherto
overlooked, must also be at work. Economic logic and evidence form the archives of the Board of
Governors suggest that phenomenon is mismanagement and defalcation by corporate officers, which
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  An article by Linda Hooks and Kenneth Robinson, “Deposit Insurance and Moral 
Hazard: Evidence from Texas Banking During the 1920s”contains a contradiction (Hooks 




  Hooks and Robinson examine balance sheet data for banks in Texas. Table 3 
focuses on state banks during the 1920s and finds “evidence that declines in capitalization 
led to increases in asset risk, as measured by loan concentrations. Such activity on the part 
of insured banks would indicate that banks with weakened financial conditions increased 
the riskiness of their asset portfolios, which would be consistent with a moral-hazard effect 
at work (p. 848).” Table 4 examines two control groups: state banks in 1909, and national 
banks during the 1920s. Neither group exhibits correlations between capitalization and 
loan concentration, suggesting that a difference between the control and treatment groups, 
one of which was deposit insurance, encouraged poorly capitalized state banks to invest in 
assets, such as loans to local farmers and businessmen, with higher expected return and 
risk. 
  According to Hooks and Robinson’s regressions in Table 2, however, such 
behavior did NOT increase the likelihood that banks failed. Banks whose portfolios 
contained a higher proportion of loans had LOWER failure rates than other banks, all else 
being equal (see coefficient on the portfolio concentration variable, which measures the 
ration of loans to assets, LOANASS). The beneficial effect of additional loans was large. 
An extra $1 of loans reduced the probability of failure to the same extent as an additional   3 
43 cents of retained earnings (-0.140/-0.327) (see Table 2, column 1). The authors 
acknowledge this result when they write “we expect a positive sign on LOANASS … 
However, LOANASS is negative and significant, the opposite of what was hypothesized.”  
  Their hypothesis rests on the notion that “declines in capitalization can induce ‘go-
for-broke’ strategies among insured banks. With less of their own funds at risk as capital 
declines, insured banks may be tempted to gamble on risky projects with a small 
probability of payoff. If these ventures prove successful, the bank gains, otherwise the 
insurance fund suffers the losses (p. 844).” The expectation of a “positive sign on 
LOANASS” presumes that investing in loans rather than safer assets, such as government 
securities and eligible commercial paper, actually resulted in large losses and high failure 
rates. Table 2’s regressions indicate the opposite. Texas banks benefited from lending more 
money. Their ex ante gambles yielded ex post profits. This is understandable since the 
banks made these loans during the era known as the Roaring 20s, when the national 
economy prospered, and Texas experienced oil and industrial booms. 
  Table 2’s regressions contain another variable, INSURED, an indicator for state 
banks, all of which had to participate in one of the two Texas deposit insurance systems. 
The author’s argue that “if moral hazard incentives are present at insured banks, leading 
them to pursue excessively risky activities, then we would expect a positive sign on 
INSURED (p. 843).” The sign is indeed “positive and significant at the 10-percent level, 
indicating that deposit insurance significantly increased the likelihood of failure (p. 843).” 
  This brings us to the contradiction in the essay, and I believe, an overlooked 
insight. The author’s interpretations of LOANASS and INSURED in Table 2 are 
inconsistent with their interpretations of Tables 3 and 4. For the latter tables, the authors   4 
claim that the structure of a bank’s assets, measured by loan concentrations in the 
portfolio, serves as a good proxy for risk. “Loans are one of the riskiest assets that banks 
can hold (p. 842).” “A higher proportion of loans leaves a bank more exposed to credit risk 
and more vulnerable to adverse economic shock (p. 843).” The statistically significant 
relationship between LOANASS, TOTCAP, and CAPLOAN reveals moral hazard at work. 
In Table 2, however, the authors’ argue that the coefficient on INSURED indicates that 
moral hazard induced excess risk taking and influenced the survival of banks. But the 
regressions also contain the variable LOANASS. If LOANASS serves as a good proxy for ex 
ante portfolio risk, as the authors argue throughout their essay and in Tables 3 and 4, then 
the variable INSURED cannot also do so. Regression analysis imposes a ceteris paribus 
assumption. The coefficient on INSURED measures the correlation between insurance and 
failure that is orthogonal to LOANASS, that is holding the loan to asset ratio constant. 
  In other words, if the coefficient on INSURED reveals moral hazard at work, it 
must reveal moral hazard operating through a channel other than distorting banks decisions 
concerning the bearing of risk. What might that channel be? 
  
Resolving the Contradiction 
  The literature on deposit insurance discusses two types of moral hazard. The first, 
which the authors explicitly search for in this essay, involves excess risk-taking among 
insured banks. The relationship at issue is that between managers and regulators, who 
indirectly underwrite gambles gone bad by zombie banks. The Savings and Loan crisis 
inspired this line of research.   5 
  The second occurs when the presence of insurance reduces the incentives for 
depositors to monitor the safety of their savings. Depositors stop monitoring the behavior 
of bankers, and no longer bother to move deposits from worse to better managed 
institutions. Mismanagement increases. Bad banks proliferate. Competitive pressures force 
good banks to cut costs and corners, initiating what may become a race to the bottom. 
  Mismanagement of this type does not generate predictable patterns in bank balance 
sheets. Some classic examples of mismanagement illustrate this point. One, a bank never 
bothers to make loans. Instead, it invests in eligible paper, deposits funds in correspondent 
banks, and keeps the bulk of its resources in its vault. Its costs exceed revenues, and it goes 
bankrupt, because its portfolio has too low of a return and too little risk. Two, a bank 
invests in a large, expensive building with beautiful new furniture and artwork, which it 
cannot afford on current revenues, and goes bankrupt. Three, bank managers do not 
perform due diligence and fail to collect outstanding debts. Losses rise. Bankruptcy results. 
In the first two examples, the balance sheets of the banks would exhibit low ratios of loans 
to assets. In the third example, the balance sheet of a bank could exhibit any level of 
investment risk. 
  This property of mismanagement makes it a likely explanation for the positive 
coefficient on INSURED in Table 2, since the logic of regression analysis dictates that the 
factor generating the coefficient must be orthogonal to LOANASS and to the underlying 
phenomena, portfolio concentration and overall asset risk, for which LOANASS proxies. 
  Data on the causes of bank suspensions during the 1920s that I have recently 
recovered from the archives of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors supports this 
supposition. Each year when deposit insurance existed in Texas between 1921 and 1926,   6 
mismanagement forced an average of 3.2% of all state banks to suspend operations. That 
fraction amounted to nearly 80% of all state bank suspensions. In the four years after 
deposit insurance, mismanagement forced an average of only 1.2% of all state banks to 
suspend operations. The share of suspensions attributed to mismanagement fell similarly 
(see Chung and Richardson 2004 for a description of the source). 
    
Conclusions 
  Hooks and Robinson indicate that their article provides additional evidence 
supporting the conventional academic wisdom. This comment argues that their essay does 
that and much more. Their regressions demonstrate that while the prevailing paradigm 
explains a portion of the events that occurred during the 1920s, some other phenomena, 
hitherto overlooked, must also be at work. Economic logic and evidence form the archives 
of the Board of Governors suggest that phenomenon is mismanagement, which increases 
when insurance reduces depositors’ incentives to monitor and react to the safety and 
soundness of banks. 
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